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Improving Candidate-Quality Preference-Specification Mechanisms: Incorporating 
(Gender-Empowering) Voter-Chosen Quotas 
 




 I conceptualise the informal outlines of a new voting system/mechanism that is more 
holistic and democratically just; the proposed alternative would incorporate (gender) quotas 
amongst other fundamental, important aspects. This conceptual outline seeks to resolve the 
primary (intellectual) obstacles for the adoption of quotas in their current form which, I contend, 
is their discordance with mainstream conceptions of democratic justice. More precisely, the 
conceptualised voting system/mechanism seeks to increase the sophistication of preference-
specification in voting procedures (thereby presenting an alternative to the prevailing, privileged 
paradigm of geospatial-constituency representation). I do not present results in the conventional 
sense; no data was analysed, no experiments run, and no software implemented. A rationale is 
provided for why this proposed voting system/mechanism, in addition to potentially 
solving/tackling some problems identified by feminist scholarship, could also solve an even larger 
class of fundamental political and democratic problems related to intersectionality (e.g., race, 
ethnicity, income, class, caste, disability, sexuality, education, age, occupation etc.) through 
enhancing the translation, representation, and implementation of voters’ interests. In terms of 
conclusions within the paper, they are largely intermediate conclusions as they relate to the 
investigation of problems as well as the informal conceptual outline of the proposed voting 
system/mechanism.  
 
Keywords: Democracy, Justice, Voting, Democratic Innovation, Representation, Gender 
Empowerment, Gender and Development, Social Choice, Mechanism Design, Algorithmic Game 




“Democracy is in crisis.” Words to this effect reverberate throughout the echo chambers of 
contemporary polities. A range of interpretations abound; the referent crisis is at the confluence of 
multiple (systemic) problems. The perennial crises of modern democracies are not confined to 
democracies; these crises stem from the intrinsic problems faced by all forms of collective 
decision-making, (political) organisations, and societies; specifically, problems encountered 
before, during, and after the translation, representation, and implementation of peoples’ interests.  
Democracy itself can be viewed as a natural response to the aforementioned problems. 
Consider Monarchy, Aristocracy, Tyranny, Despotism, Oligarchy, Plutocracy, Empire, and other 
forms of government: characteristically, although a subset of interests are translated, represented 
and implemented, the interests of the majority were inherently excluded (or at least inadequately 
translated, represented and implemented). Democratic forms of government have sought to ensure 
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or improve justice and fairness in the translation, representation and implementation of interests 
through various mechanisms (e.g. freedom of speech, a free press etc.) and especially through the 
provision of one vote for each and every eligible person (often citizens) during political elections; 
this enshrined a sense of intrinsic equality through political rights and thereby enabled the political 
freedoms of self-determination and self-government. Even so, modern democracies continue to 
experience numerous complex problems when translating, representing and implementing the 
specificity of peoples’ complex preferences to enable substantive self-determination and effective 
self-government. This paper aims to begin addressing those problems by conceptualising a novel 
voting system.  
 While presenting the conceptual outlines of this novel voting system, the paper also 
incorporates a preliminary investigation of parts of the political gender quotas literature. Feminist 
scholarship has been remarkable at identifying several key problems relating to the translation, 
representation, and implementation of women’s’ interests, and the lessons learnt are relevant for 
humanity. Indeed, before perusing the political gender quotas literature, I was personally 
convinced that ‘imposed’ gender quotas on countries’ legislatures are intrinsically undesirable 
because of gender quotas’ theoretical restriction of voters’ choice (in terms of social choice theory, 
it is a ‘restricted domain’; Arrow (1950, 1963), Gibbard (1973), and Satterthwaite (1975) analysed 
the profound significance of this). The normative significance of restricting voters’ choices is 
apparent in the context of representative democracies most often being characterised by voters’ 
right to choose their representatives; therefore, one could cogently argue that the restriction of 
choice is inherently undemocratic.  
However, upon examining some of the literature on political quotas for women, various 
valid concerns and deeply disturbing problems emerged that should not be dismissed; these 
concerns and problems are particular cases of broader, more general issues with respect to the 
stifled translation, representation, and implementation of peoples’ interests. Learning from 
problems and seeking solutions can facilitate solutions for broader classes of problems across 
(democratic) voting systems and mechanisms. When solutions adhere to the constraints and 
demands of democratic justice, they can be used for systemic political reform. The potential 
applications outlined within this paper are primarily designed for a democratic political context; 
even so, variations of voting systems are used in numerous other domains (e.g., education, 
employment, healthcare, equity markets, etc.), and insights from the research presented herein is 
relevant for other domains. Alternative settings and contexts can be more general in some respects 
whilst simultaneously more restrictive in others, especially compared to democratic voting systems 
characterised by one vote per voter. 
 
 
Methodology and Brief Outline of Voting System 
When considering the potential for quotas to be a sufficient means for encouraging more 
gender-equitable forms of political representation, it would be fruitful to examine the conceptual 
basis of quotas alongside the theoretical and actual outcomes. Proceeding accordingly, I contend 
that quotas imposed by a legislature upon the electorate, political parties and/or on legislative 
entities are not necessarily sufficient for actualising gender-equitable forms of political 
representation. Nevertheless, I concede that voluntarily implemented quotas routinely do not 
achieve the desired effects and, therefore, that more systematic voting system reform is needed. I 
conjecture that the principal (intellectual) obstacle for the current form in which gender quotas are 
advocated is that they do not accord with (mainstream) conceptions of democratic justice and that 
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the legitimate concerns and objectives of arguments for quotas can be addressed in ways that 
resolve tensions with conceptions of democratic justice. I present my alternative conception of 
incorporating quotas within a more holistic, general framework for reforming representative 
democracies’ voting systems in ways that do not, for example, inherently privilege geospatial-
constituency paradigms of democratic representation.  
Advocating the form of gender quotas outlined in this paper may win more supporters and 
be a sufficient means for encouraging more gender-equitable forms of political representation to 
advance gender empowerment. Moreover, the mechanisms advocated here could theoretically 
advance the translation, representation, and implementation of interests beyond those of gender 
empowerment because the proposed solutions can be used (without loss of generality) to solve 
larger, encompassing classes of problems. The pressing concerns of intersectionality, covered 
especially by modern and contemporary feminist scholarship and activism, can thereby be 
addressed (for discussions of ‘intersectionality’ see, for example, Yuval-Davis (2006), Davis 
(2008), Choo and Ferree (2010), Shields (2008), McCall (2005), Nash (2008), Crenshaw (1989), 
Bilge (2010), Alexander-Floyd (2012), Brah and Phoenix (2004), Cho, Crenshaw and McCall 
(2013), and Collins (1998)). Essentially, by solving the problems that are identified and actively 
confronted by contemporary feminist and women’s’ interest scholarship in ways that accord with 
democratic justice, equality, and freedom to choose, an even larger class of problems can be 
solved; thus, it would be in the general interest and extremely rational to do so. 
 Restricting voters’ choice is intrinsically problematic for achieving social justice 
objectives; an alternative is to increase voters’ choice. In representative democracies, a ‘candidate’ 
in elections is someone who can be elected to public office (through some voting mechanism or 
procedure). In Social Choice Theory, the word ‘candidate’ is also used to denote any outcome of 
a voting mechanism/system. In this paper, the term ‘candidate’ will be used in both senses and is 
intended to be amenable to contextualisation by the reader. Initially, fundamental aspects of the 
proposed voting system are introduced and briefly rationalised before presenting the problems and 
benefits identified by the gender quotas literature. 
 
 
Properties and aspects of the voting system 
Aspect 1: Allow voters to divide their votes (i.e., do not continue restricting votes to being 
indivisible). Voters would retain single, equal votes (i.e., one vote per eligible person), but they 
could divide and allocate them amongst different candidates accordingly. Therefore, the principle 
of democratic equality is maintained while voters could exercise greater choice. One might suggest 
that this would not be practical in a rank-order voting system, but if voters each have one and only 
one vote, one could also conceive of voters being able to divide their votes among candidate-
quality preferences (discussed in aspect 5), the interests they seek to be translated, represented, 
and implemented (discussed in aspect 4) and therefore between different rank-orders. Pertaining 
to mathematical optimisation, the problem of who or what to vote for thus becomes ‘relaxed’ into 
a continuous (as opposed to discrete) constrained optimisation problem.  
Aspect 2: Allow voters to (re-)allocate their votes as frequently as wanted: i.e., enable 
continuous re-allocation rather than merely periodic re-allocation. This property would entail 
voters no longer having their votes’ re-allocation confined to election periods. A question here is, 
even if votes are re-allocated frequently, does that mean that a politician is simply removed or 
elected after crossing particular thresholds? Enacting such thresholds risk being arbitrary, 
problematic, and impractical but, combined with aspect 6 (where voters can empower 
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representatives to varying degrees rather than ‘equal weights’ within the legislative body), this 
becomes practicable and potentially palatable. One may argue that if the social justice objectives 
of quotas are met then there is no need to frequently re-allocate votes. When admitting the 
possibility for the different dimensions of peoples’ experiences (gender, ethnicity, religion, race, 
class, education, occupation, sexuality, disability etc.) to be of varying importance over time, it is 
justifiable to allow voters to re-allocate votes according to self-determined frequencies. Indeed, 
simplistically presuming that particular dimensions of peoples’ experiences periodically vary in 
importance, the problem of vote re-allocation could be algorithmically reduced to a continuous 
form of the ‘Bamboo garden trimming problem’ presented by Gąsieniec et al. (2017); moreover, 
scheduling problems are well-studied in Computer Science (e.g., Lin and Lin (1997), Serafini and 
Ukovich (1989), Fishburn and Lagarias (2002), and Chan and Chin (1993)). 
Aspect 3: Allow voters to specify what portions of their votes are to be allocated to each 
candidate. This follows naturally from being able to divide one’s vote. When considering the 
possibility of one agreeing with various (or all) candidates on a variety of issues to different 
extents, this property is a natural inclusion in a preliminary list of mechanistic improvements to 
voters’ choice. In an election with three candidates A, B, and C, a voter can assign varying fractions 
of their vote respectively to each of the candidates (or less, if they wish) so long as the sum of all 
portions assigned are lesser than or equal to one (thereby adhering to the democratic equality 
principle). The mechanism could further allow voters to actively vote against a candidate. Say a 
candidate receives 16.2 votes and a certain voter, rather than voting for another candidate, would 
rather actively and wholly vote against this candidate, the voter could decrement the candidate’s 
votes from 16.2 to 15.2 (or by any other number less than one, should they prefer). 
Aspect 4: Allow voters to specify the interest(s) they wish to be represented and 
implemented through the candidate (and, potentially, how they want them to be represented and 
implemented, if this extent of specificity is preferred), corresponding to (the portions of) their votes 
that are allocated to each candidate. Through this property, voters can specify a subset of interests 
that they want represented and how they want them represented. For example, if voters choose to 
assign some fractions of their votes to candidates, they can further specify portions of that fraction 
to represent their gender interests, their geospatial community’s interest (e.g., village, town, city, 
region), their ethnic and racial interests etc., or voter-determined weightings of subsets of those 
qualities. Then, for example, voters could also specify that their gender interests (for example) 
should be represented through certain policies, that their community interests be ideally 
represented through increased local infrastructure development and so on. Voters can also simply 
leave that specificity open to candidates whom they trust to represent the various dimensions of 
their interests. This aspect can also be used to advance the translation, representation, and 
implementation of other peoples’ interests (i.e., voters expressing preferences over other peoples’ 
interests, including non-voters). After all, many voters may have never experienced sexism, 
misogyny, racism, ethnicism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, xenophobia, sexual abuse, 
paedophilia, poverty, unemployment etc. but those voters may still choose to vote for candidates 
who will confront such problems. A safeguard is that if a politician reneges or performs in a non-
satisfactory way for the voter(s), voters can re-assign/redistribute their votes. Thus, this property 
deters unwarranted flexibility from politicians, especially where politicians may otherwise 
misinterpret the imperfectly signalled ‘will of the people’. The property further incentivises 
honesty from both voters and candidates. The specifics of the mechanism(s) required to practically 
implement this property are debatable. Moreover, designing the mechanism beyond the conceptual 
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outline in this paper is beyond this article’s scope; it will require recourse to formal methods in 
algorithmic mechanism design and related fields.  
Aspect 5: Allow voters to specify their necessary, sufficient, and/or desirable qualities of 
the candidates they seek to assign/have assigned portions of their votes to. Following from the 
previous aspects, we naturally turn to the ability of voters to choose the qualities of the candidates 
themselves. Voters can (algorithmically) specify necessary, sufficient and/or desirable conditions 
for their votes to be allocated to in a candidate. It still remains to be determined whether this would 
be from a list of all candidates (i.e. an ‘omega set’ of candidates that encompasses all possible 
candidates, potentially including those who may not ordinarily or explicitly put themselves 
forward as candidates) or whether the specifications of candidate-qualities from voters would then 
be aggregated according to whoever has the overlapping candidate-qualities prior to a pool of 
candidates being identified as eligible and/or solicited before another round of voting procedures 
commence. There can also be an element of choice regarding how the preferences are aggregated, 
but, once again, the specific mechanism to be used is debatable. For example, voters may choose 
to allocate fractions of their singular vote to candidates who are of gender X, socioeconomic 
background Y, with educational level Z, race A, ethnicity B, disability C, sexuality D, religion E, 
caste F, income G, from age range H, occupation I, previous occupation J, with institutional 
affiliation K, ideology L etc. This set of preference-specifications can be readjusted according to 
voters’ intentions and the nature of the relation of the voter’s preferences to the specific interests 
the voter wants represented (and how the voters want those interests to be represented), relating 
back to aspect 4 of this voting mechanism. Through aggregated candidate-quality preferences and 
votes assigned, ‘seats’ could be allocated in corresponding legislatures according to voter-chosen 
quotas. 
Aspect 6: Elected candidates/representatives can have varying degrees of voting 
power/influence in legislatures according to the extent of voters’ choice to empower them (i.e., 
rather than each elected politician being restricted to having the same voting power as other 
politicians, voters would collectively choose the extent of their relative voting powers within a 
legislature). Elected representatives in modern democracies have equally weighted votes in the 
legislatures they are elected to. However, the rationale for this appears to be one of historical 
practicality; that is, it is not clear why each elected representative should have equal weighting of 
votes in the legislature compared to other representatives in the same way that it is justifiable that, 
from a democratic justice and equality perspective, voters should have equally weighted votes 
during elections. One potential justification for elected representatives having equal weight is 
within the context of a geospatial-constituency paradigm of representation. An initial thought for 
mechanisms to determine respective voting ‘powers’/‘weights’ of each representative could be 
based on proportionality (i.e. the weight of a representative’s vote in a legislature relative to other 
representatives is proportional to the votes assigned to them as a proportion of the total amount of 
votes cast). This could entail the number of members of a legislative body increasing and 
decreasing over time according to voters’ aggregated preferences, especially as voters re-assign 
their votes according to the specificity, translation, and representation of candidate-quality 
preferences (aspect 5) so that the diversity, intensity, and significance of preferences are 
sufficiently captured. However, if elected representatives have differing voting powers within their 
legislatures (weighted by votes assigned or otherwise), the compensation of elected representatives 
may need to be iterated to prevent systemic abuse. Representatives’ pay is non-trivial and beyond 
this article’s scope but is further discussed in relation to an identified problem later in the paper 
(the opportunity cost of being a politician). Moreover, there is a significant body of research 
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regarding politicians’ pay (e.g., Besley (2004), Kotakorpi and Poutvaara (2011), Tella and Fisman 
(2004), Braendle (2015), and Ferraz and Finan (2009)).  
The mathematical constraint and democratic justice principle of one vote per votes has not 
thus far been violated, and expansions of voters’ choice have been sought. One critique of this 
voting system is that it is complex with regard to comprehensibility and computability. But this is 
not an intrinsic, system-fault because comprehensibility is a matter of voters’ education regarding 
the system whilst (problematic) computational complexity can be managed through more 
sophisticated algorithmic mechanism design (a formal, thorough exploration of which would be 
beyond this paper’s scope and purpose).  
It is worthwhile to examine key problems identified by the gender quotas literature (which 
can and often does align problems in political economy and public policy more broadly) that can 
be solved through this voting system/mechanism and, where they cannot be solved directly, to 
suggest further potential solutions that can be appended to and/or articulated within this voting 
system and mechanism(s). 
 
 
Investigating the Conceptual Basis for Quotas 
 Proponents and detractors of gender quotas routinely address dimensions of utility and 
justice. Proponents may illustratively argue that a diverse legislature that better reflects society is 
intrinsically just and conducive to superior political performance. Detractors may argue that it is 
intrinsically unjust to legally restrict voters’ choice and that, if women cannot navigate through 
politics to get elected through ‘open competition’, performance is compromised. Detractors might 
also dispute the epistemic benefits of diversity, but such arguments run counter to principles of 
democratic justice and equality; voters ultimately choose representatives and the (non-)diversity 
is therefore ultimately chosen by voters (albeit in historically restricted and imperfectly collective 
capacities). There are merits to at least some of both proponents’ and detractors’ arguments, but 
there is a unifying theme which shows that there are crucial points of overlap, despite distinct 
differences. 
 Detractors are correct that it is unjust to legally restrict voters’ choice because this runs 
counter to principles of democratic equality and justice. Even presuming that restricting voters’ 
choice improves outcomes, if this line of reasoning is taken to its logical ends it facilitates a 
(democratic) variation of technocracy pertaining to the representation of peoples’ interests; 
consequently, it may prove to be a ‘slippery slope’ (even if unintended by activists). For well-
intentioned detractors, the ends do not justify the means; permitting the underlying allows for some 
dangerous possibilities that threaten democracy. Conversely, a common reason proponents 
advocate this restriction of voters’ choice is because they believe various constituents’ interests 
would be better represented, while detractors’ a priori grounds are that, when the domain of voters’ 
choice is restricted, there is a strong chance that the representation of constituents’ interests will 
be compromised. Trying to frame this in the language of Social Choice theory, gender quotas’ 
proponents might further contend that the choice of candidates is already practically restricted due 
to institutional factors; therefore, a restriction in principle could, in practice, increase the choice 
of candidates. Detractors of gender quotas believe quotas will impose rigid restrictions on voters’ 
choice. Mainstream proponents and detractors both, therefore, seek to improve and/or defend 
conceptions of choice insofar as it advances the translation, representation, and implementation of 
voters’ interests. 
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 Returning to proponents’ arguments that diverse legislatures that better reflect society are 
intrinsically desirable: these arguments align with the justified belief that a diverse society’s 
interests may be better translated, represented, and implemented by correspondingly diverse 
representatives. Aside from benefits associated with symbolic representation, it is important to 
explain why a diverse set of representatives would be intrinsically preferable to a non-diverse set 
of representatives if they were not, in principle or in practice, superior in translating, representing, 
and implementing society’s interests. As mentioned previously, detractors may contend that an 
inability to navigate ‘free and open competition’ to get elected may increase the likelihood of 
comparatively poorer performance as representatives; this argument does not address the 
continued inadequate representation and the feeling of disproportionate underrepresentation of 
distinctly gendered dimensions of policy, despite purportedly ‘free and open’ competition. 
Arguments based on democratic justice and utility are intertwined and inextricable. A common 
objective is expanding choice, but conflicts remain around how that choice ought to be expanded 
and whether certain choices ought to be restricted. 
 Phillips (1995) analyses arguments against gender quotas and suggests that “while 
concerns about social divisiveness and sectional narrowing are part of the standard fare in 
arguments against other forms of group-based representation, opponents of gender quotas are most 
likely to take their stand on a general critique of affirmative action, on the paucity of ‘experienced’ 
women, and the risk that the overall caliber of politicians will fall.” Although it has been some 
time since Phillips’ paper was published, it is worth noting that Phillips convincingly eviscerates 
each of these arguments but does not address broader theoretical questions: namely, the tensions 
that gender quotas have with (mainstream) conceptions of democratic justice and the contention 
that the introduction of quotas could reinforce the (possibly subconscious) divisive mentality 
prevalent in patriarchal societies that women should cater to women’s’ interests and men to men’s’. 
The former makes quotas theoretically problematic to implement. Therefore, I will address this 
more within this article, but it is also worth examining whether the potential for social divisiveness 
can be alleviated through the proposed voting system reform.  
 
 
Quotas potentially reinforcing social divisiveness 
 Society is already ‘divided’ along numerous lines (e.g., gender, class, race, religion, 
ideology, age, class, education, institutional affiliation, profession, income etc.); these divisions 
have arisen regardless of quotas. Difficulties remain for accurately measuring the nature of 
societies’ divisions, prioritising those in need of addressing, and deciding how to address them. If 
voters can specify candidate-qualities through the reformed voting system (by aspect 5 in the 
preceding ‘Methodology…’ section) as well as their interests they want advocated (aspect 4), this 
would provide some factual bases to form various indices to understand divisions. Therefore, 
candidates seeking election, according to the proposed ‘voter-chosen’ quotas or otherwise, would 
be incentivised to address the interests corresponding to those voter-chosen quotas; otherwise, 
elected representatives risk diminished voting power (aspect 6). From aspect 4 (where voters can 
choose what interests are represented and, potentially, how those interests are represented), 
peoples’ discontents can be formalised within votes rather than their votes being indicators of 
reality. Through aspects 5 and 6, candidates can better discern their constituents’ preferences and 
also the divisions amongst constituents (who would no longer necessarily be bound to geospatial 
communities). Aspect 4 also enables voters to ‘lend their votes’ to benefit another group (i.e., vote 
in a way that advances another group’s interests). 
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 Gender quotas placed upon legislatures may indeed encourage more gender-equitable 
forms of political representation, but this comes at the cost of restricting voters’ choice through, 
for example, seat-reservation. One might justifiably argue that the choice is already largely and 
practically restricted to males from particular socioeconomic backgrounds, but, in principle and 
by law, women representatives are not usually formally prevented from being elected except, for 
example, due to prevailing patriarchal institutions that perpetuate (possibly subconscious) sexist 
prejudice and stereotyping during selection procedures (Edwards and McAllister 2002; Shepherd-
Robinson and Lovenduski 2002; Dittmar 2015; Krook and Nugent 2016; Ashe 2017). This unfairly 
leads to female politicians generally needing to be better than their male counterparts to be selected 
and to win (see Elgood et al. (2001), Paul and Smith (2008), Mo (2015)). 
 
 
Institutional sexism, stereotyping, and prejudice during candidate selection 
Institutional sexism reinforces stereotyping and prejudice during candidate selection 
procedures leads to female politicians needing to be better than their male counterparts to be 
selected and to win. The proposed voting system can completely bypass the political party system 
since constituencies would no longer be constrained to a geospatial-paradigm; voters could 
continue choosing to coalesce with their geospatial constituencies, depending on the quota and 
preferences specified, but they would no longer be required to. Moreover, there is considerable 
scholarship regarding ‘gerrymandering’ by political parties and politicians (Rorabacher 2008; 
Singh 2000; Issacharoff 2002; McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2009; Johnston 2002; Giugăl et al. 
2017). Since political parties’ bases of local power could be bypassed through non-geospatial 
quotas, rational political parties would need to field more women candidates to fill voter-chosen 
quotas and/or to prevent dilution of power (by aspects 4, 5, and 6 in the ‘Methodology…’ section); 
political parties that remained unresponsive to voter-chosen candidate-qualities would risk 
diminished influence unless they successfully tackled sexist stereotyping and prejudice. Elected 
representatives not affiliated with political parties would be incentivised to be more responsive to 
the specificity of their constituents’ interests as opposed to federal/regional/local party policy. 
Political parties may also become more responsive and reflective with their outlooks. Moreover, 
the effects of nonpartisanism have been explored in empirically observed contexts (Schaffner, 
Streb and Wright 2001; Bonneau and Cann 2015; Kirkland and Coppock 2017). Voter-chosen 
gender quotas would also mitigate female candidates’ need to directly contend with voters’ sexist 
biases, especially where candidates run to fill voter-chosen quotas.  
 
 
Inequalities and differences among and within groups 
Democracy can be broadly characterised as being about ‘power to the people’; legally 
restricting the domain (along gendered lines or otherwise) from which voters’ preferences can be 
expressed risks undermining core democratic values (e.g., by restricting the formalisation of 
competing and/or complementary ‘representative claims’, see Saward (2006, 2010)). I contend 
that this tension is currently the principal (intellectual) obstacle to garnering support for and 
enacting adoption of quotas. An arising corollary is that if one were to restrict the electorate’s 
choice, this simultaneously restricts many female voters’ choice to electing females; this may not 
reflect the preference of all women. This tension is further compounded by the focus on 
intersectionality in contemporary, mainstream feminist thought, advocacy, and activism; 
introducing quotas for women may prove insufficient given that various overlapping allies (e.g. 
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the LGBTQIA+ community and ethnic minorities) may be under threat of further marginalisation 
despite gender quotas. Many American and British feminists argued throughout the 1980s and 
1990s that focusing attention on inequalities and differences between men and women is 
problematic because it tends to marginalise the various significant inequalities and differences 
among women themselves (see Collins (2000), Mohanty (1991), and Spelman (1988)). Citing, as 
an example, racially-based inequalities in the USA, Black and Hispanic women were found to face 
the biggest gender pay gap versus White males and earn significantly less than White and Asian 
women (Gould, Schieder and Geier 2016) despite the productivity gains associated with both 
ethnic and gender diversity (Hunt, Layton and Prince 2015). Moreover, they have additional work-
related stressors to contend with compared to White women (Hall, Everett and Hamilton-Mason 
2012). In the Indian context, examples of inequalities between women include racism faced by 
North-East Indians (McDuie-Ra 2015a, 2015b; Gohaini 2014) and caste differences (Deshpande 
and Sharma 2016). 
 Through enabling varied degrees of candidate-quality specifications (by aspect 5 from the 
‘Methodology…’ section), the capability to decide what interests are represented, how they are 
represented (aspect 4), and the ability to divide the vote (aspect 1), voters could specify their ideal 
mode of representation according to the inequalities they face. The aspects of the proposed voting 
system allow for inequalities and differences among women and other groups to be accounted for 
by voters and their representatives. Numerous representative democratic voting systems currently 
privilege geospatial constituencies for representation as opposed to other potential constituencies 
(e.g., gender, socioeconomic background, race, culture, ethnicity, caste, sexuality, age, disability, 
profession, income, institution, ideology etc.); the concerns of intersectionality are insufficiently 
unaccounted for in representative democracies’ legislatures, voting systems, and institutions. For 
example, a poor, lesbian, transgender woman may have far more in common with the LGBTQIA+ 
community across her country rather than the geospatial constituency she is clumped together with 
in elections (where she is often more likely to be either a distinctly disadvantaged or even 
disenfranchised minority). She could choose to coalesce with some parts of the LGBTQIA+ 
community rather than others or, alternatively, to coalesce on other grounds (e.g. LGBTQIA+ and 
profession or LGBTQIA+ and class).  
 
 
Permanent quotas are rigid and static 
 This proposed voting system/mechanism would also inherently address Mansbridge’s 
(2010) insightful recommendation that because “the benefits of descriptive representation vary 
greatly by context, it would be wise, in building descriptive representation into any given 
democratic institutional design, to make its role fluid, dynamic, and easily subject to change” since 
“permanent quotas are relatively undesirable because they are both static and highly essentializing. 
They assume, for example, that any woman can stand for all women, any Black for all Blacks. 
They do not respond well to constituents’ many-sided and cross-cutting interests.” The proposed 
voting system and mechanism(s) enables women and Black people, for example, to pick the 
specific sort of women and/or Black people they would like to represent them (whilst also 
specifying the exact interests they want represented); it also enables women and Black voters to 
vote for non-women and non-Black candidates with particular qualities to represent their specific 
interests. This extends to gender more broadly, all races, classes, ethnicities, religions, castes, 
sexualities, disabilities, age ranges, educational backgrounds, income groups, professions, 
ideologies etc. The dynamic, ‘ongoing’ nature of the voting system (aspect 2 within the 
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‘Methodology…’ section) where voters can continuously re-assign their votes also means that any 
voter-chosen quotas are not rigid or static because voter-chosen quotas are responsive to voters’ 
malleable preferences. 
 Nevertheless, one may argue that women may still not choose gender quotas because many 
have internalised sexism from the prevailing patriarchy. While valid, I will not proceed along the 
patronising and dehumanising lines of argument suggesting that, because women are oppressed, 
they do not know what is in their best interest; I instead suggest that if quotas are in women’s’ best 
interests it is advantageous to offer a chance to choose them and thereby empower them alongside 
all voters more broadly. Even so, it is worthwhile examining whether internalised sexism and 
misogyny can be countered through this proposed voting system reform. 
 
 
Internalised sexism and misogyny 
Internalised sexism and misogyny may prevent gender quotas from being chosen by voters 
in the reformed voting system. This is distinct from but analogous and related to internalised 
ethnicism, racism, ableism, homophobia, transphobia, casteism, classism, xenophobia etc. 
Psychologically internalised discrimination, prejudices, and stereotypes that result in cognitive 
distortions are difficult to mitigate. Reminding the reader that the proposed voting 
mechanism(s)/system have an unrestricted domain through which voters can also promote the 
welfare of others (included in aspect 4 in the ‘Methodology…’ section), those voters’ objective of 
helping others can help confront internalised discrimination, prejudices, and stereotypes. For 
instance, although movements for women’s suffrage globally were primarily led and composed by 
women, many women did not assist, while numerous men did; historically and globally members 
of an ‘out group’ have often supported various Civil Rights movements. I concede, however, that 
this channel/benefit is not adequately developed or convincing. 
 
 
The Outcomes of Political Quotas: Mixed Results 
 Though this proposal may be worthwhile in principle, it may not result in desired outcomes 
in practice. It would be valuable to examine outcomes from the actual implementation of quotas 
whilst relating the problematic aspects back to this article’s proposals. 
 
 
The opportunity cost of political activity is too high 
 Everett (2009) found that “the impact of reserving one-third of local elective offices for 
women on the substantive representation of women appears ambiguous” in India and that EWRs 
(elected women representatives) “continue to face many obstacles” such as the chronic stressors 
associated with the “triple burden”. For example, Hust (2004) described the case of a poor Dalit 
(Dalits being a historically disadvantaged group in India) EWR in the state of Orissa in India: she 
does not attend political meetings during the planting season since the monetary opportunity cost 
is too high; she could earn 50 rupees a day through casual labour whilst the local governments’ 
sitting fee is only 30 rupees and there were difficulties associated with obtaining payments in a 
regular manner. Political lives and careers are often perceived to be the preserve of the wealthy 
and privileged. Within the context of the proposed voting system, politicians have a mandate to 
directly represent particular constituents’ interests; politicians/candidates may well benefit from 
voluntarily incremented funding from various communities and ‘Special Interests’ to supplement 
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any fixed salary received. If elected representatives perform well when translating, representing, 
and implementing peoples’ interests, either the constituents themselves or allies of the constituents 
may choose to increase funding to the representatives, thereby decreasing the opportunity cost of 
political activity. Taxpayer-funded compensation is the norm for elected politicians across 
countries; one could implement various compensation schemes according to the various roles the 
elected representatives take up within their legislatures and proportional to the aggregate (portions 




Bryld (2001) quotes an EWR from the state of Karnataka in India as saying “Every time 
men speak ten sentences, women speak one”; this exemplifies an important difficulty for 
representing and implementing interests through legislatures, where expressive capabilities are 
constrained. Although expressive capabilities are broader than speech (e.g., body language, 
writing, transmission channels available for disseminating viewpoints, culture, norms, values, 
beliefs etc.), the concern addressed here primarily pertains to speaking. One simplistic solution is 
that, if there is one man and one woman and the man speaks 10 sentences for every one sentence 
the woman speaks, voters could send 10 women instead of one (albeit each with proportionally 
diminished voting power) so that, in aggregate, the elected women representatives can speak 10 
times as much as previously. However, this is a somewhat presumptuous and trivial numerical 
solution aside from the fact that it may prove beneficial for groups that are in such a small minority 
that even having one person symbolically and descriptively speak for them could be highly 
beneficial (despite diminished voting power). 
A more potent solution is that if elected representatives behave in a way that displeases 
voters, not only will voters be able to retract their vote, but they could even use (portions of) their 
vote to actively vote against and diminish the voting power of that representative (aspect 3) whilst 
specifying why. Representatives continuing to behave in ways that are met with voters’ 
disapproval would see their voting power further diminish and, therefore, they would experience 
institutional incentives to correct their behaviours. Coupled with previously cited problems and 
accompanying potential solutions regarding politicians’ pay and opportunity costs, this could also 
translate to financial incentives for elected representatives to respect others’ viewpoints. 
 
 
Harassment and violence  
The violence that EWRs can face is particularly worrying. Krook (2017) documented and 
described violence towards women in politics more broadly. George Mathew (2004) reported that 
a tribal woman in the state of Madhya Pradesh in India burned herself to death in 2003 after being 
harassed by “corrupt officials.” Water tank owners in the city of Madurai in the state of Tamil 
Nadu murdered a woman councillor when she set up a water system that put them out of business. 
Violence against EWRs stems from the grassroots threats of physical violence and harassment that 
patriarchal institutions have historically and contemporarily sought to legitimate against women. 
As with the previous problems, voters could actively vote against particular aspects of 
representatives’ and those representatives’ allies’ cultures; however, cultural transformations are 
not straightforward.  
Moreover, if the proposed voting system was implemented there is a strong likelihood that 
there would be more representatives (women or otherwise) who would have mandates to translate, 
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represent, and implement gender-empowering policy; gendered shifts in policy along with the 
increased diversity of elected representatives can substantively challenge patriarchal institutions. 
While social attitudes will not disappear through voting system reform, the voting system does 
facilitate grassroots empowerment. Therefore, various interest groups would be empowered and 
further incentivised to educate and persuade. A diffusion of influence to activists and entities can 
thereby accelerate positive social change. 
 
 
Skewed and biased representations/reflections of intended constituencies 
The mixed results of gender quotas are further compounded by Mateo Diaz’s (2005) 
finding from various studies that “increased numbers of female representatives” frequently failed 
“to translate into either the improved representation of the female electorate or the improved 
advocacy of feminist issues”. Htun (2004) concurred that their “collective presence has thus far 
failed to produce major shifts in policy and practice”. Nevertheless, there are econometric analyses 
which show evidence of distinctly gender-empowering shifts in policy; Chattopadhyay and Duflo 
(2004) found that, in the state of West Bengal in India, women were more likely than men to 
complain about drinking water and roads. This translated into greater investment with respect to 
those concerns in their panchayats when there were women chairpersons (compared to male 
chairpersons). They found that this was also the case in the state of Rajasthan where there are 
distinct cultural dissimilarities, so this supports the notion that gendered shifts in policy are not 
solely cultural phenomena. Their findings also lend support to Dahlereup and Freidenvall’s (2010) 
contention against “the Scandinavian notion that the introduction of quota systems is very difficult, 
if not impossible, if women do not have a solid power base in parliament or in the political party 
in question.” This is because they feel that this is contradicted by the “rapid diffusion of quota 
measures worldwide” enabling women to participate politically “in countries at all levels of 
development and in various social and economic political systems…”. Isaac (2005) reported that, 
in the state of Kerala in India, EWRs’ confidence levels increased. Although this is encouraging, 
Kerala’s high female literacy rates contrast with the rest of India, South Asia more broadly, and 
much of the poor, global South. Rai et al. (2006) found that the majority of EWRs in India are 
from lower socioeconomic strata (both in terms of education and class) whilst in Pakistan more 
than half of EWRs are illiterate and very few own land. However, in Bangladesh EWRs came from 
a better socioeconomic status than average, rural women. 
Quotas currently result in skewed and biased representations/reflections of their intended 
constituencies. This limits the possibility and extent of descriptive representation while also 
limiting the potential for voters to decide upon the best candidate-qualities required to 
substantively represent the specificity of their interests. Through all the aspects of the proposed 
voting system and mechanism(s), but especially aspects 4 and 5 (outlined in the ‘Methodology…’ 
section) which explicitly enable voters to specify candidate-qualities and the interests they want 
represented, any bias in characteristics of elected representatives would better reflect the 
underlying reality of voters’ preferences compared to current implementations of quotas. 
Mathematically speaking, this can be attributed to the voters being posed with continuous (rather 
than discrete) constrained optimisation problems (aspect 1). 
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Career incentives and voters’ expectations 
 Legislative careers entail the expectation of representing all peoples’ interests within their 
respective geospatial community because voters with diverse preferences across countries 
formally coalesce in legislatures based upon geospatial communities. Therefore, certain groups’ 
interests within geospatial communities are privileged over others’, and quotas do not satisfactorily 
accomplish the objective of substantive representation of women’s interests. Htun and Jones’s 
(2002) study showed how, in Argentina, a third of the female legislators introduced bills in the 
area of women’s rights, and 11 percent of bills related to children and families; this illustrates that 
although a proportion of women actively promoted women’s substantive representation, the 
majority did not. The authors stated that “the vast majority of women who enter politics in Latin 
America do not campaign on women’s issues… nor do they make such issues the central focus of 
their legislative careers.” This, amongst other problematic aspects of political careers, may be 
addressed through holistic voting system reform.  
 One problem with expecting EWRs to advocate gendered policy issues is that, within 
geospatially privileged conceptions of representation, constituents are most often not just female 
but also male and from a variety of backgrounds; the non-diverse composition may not be 
conducive to representing the prioritising of certain interests. EWRs risk their political careers and 
prospects for re-election by potentially alienating half the electorate; this partially explains why 
the impact of gender quotas on gender-equitable forms of political representation appear mixed. 
Philips (1995) suggested that women’s policy agencies may be better positioned to wholly 
advocate women’s issues since it is within their remit to do so; however, this does not confer the 
other advantages of having EWRs. The proposed voting system would facilitate women’s policy 
agencies direct access to and lobbying of EWRs that have mandates to represent women’s’ issues 
whilst also learning about the interests of other coalitions that could affect the outcomes of 
legislature’s votes but about which the agencies may not have otherwise possessed sufficient 
information for lobbying purposes. Through the proposed voting system reform, those EWRs 
elected through voter-chosen gender quotas rather than primarily geospatial-community grounds 
(which can be viewed as imposed ‘geospatial quotas’) could solely advocate women’s issues and 
mitigate damage to their legislative careers because the electorate’s preference-specifications 
would democratically legitimate their doing so. 
Referring to findings of the distinctly gendered policy and legislative advocacy that EWRs 
tend to engage in (see also Pande and Ford 2012) whilst also acknowledging the problematic 
aspects of women having their expressive capabilities curtailed due to the prevailing patriarchy, 
incorporating quotas into this proposal for holistic voting system reform could (theoretically) 
positively impact political career incentives. It is worth re-iterating these incentive effects. Given 
that the proportion of seats allocated on the bases of quotas (gender, sexuality, socioeconomic 
background, caste, race, culture etc.) would be subject to change in every round of ongoing 
elections, invoking the aforementioned conceptual benefits of fluidity and flexibility that 
Mansbridge (2010) advocated in opposition to permanency and rigidity, male elected 
representatives would be under threat of losing seats through voter-chosen quotas within the 
reformed voting system. Through this constant tension, male elected representatives could improve 
the probability of holding onto their seats if they incorporated women’s issues and ensured 
sensitivity to intersectionality to demonstrate representative credibility to heterogeneous voters. 
Indeed, women (and other groups in society) elected from voter-chosen quotas may never lose 
their seats if voters feel descriptive representation is necessary along these dimensions, and, 
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conversely, there would be further institutional incentive for those who hold a seat with fewer 
quotas attached to them to represent general interests (rather than various special interests).  
Empowering voters in ways that are consistent with mainstream conceptions of democratic 
justice helps overcome intellectual obstacles while practically and naturally incorporating 
masculinities (Levant 2011; Morrell, Jewkes and Lindegger 2012; Fields et al. 2015; Cornwall and 
Lindisfarne 2016) into Gender and Development whilst aligning with the objective of encouraging 
more gender-equitable forms of political representation. Malleable systems such as the one 
proposed in this article would remain sensitive to changing and evolving perceptions, power 
structures, and contexts through incorporating fluidity and flexibility in representation by 
enhancing voters’ preference-specification capabilities and choice. 
Nevertheless, this proposal still does not directly address the deeply concerning and 
problematic patriarchy prevailing throughout most contemporary societies where incidences of 
violence, access to education, property rights, economic empowerment, social status, bodily 
autonomy, and so on remain deeply gendered. Incorporating quotas into broader proposals for 
voting system reform across representative democracies might positively permeate these domains 
and alleviate problems. Advocating quotas in ways that are intellectually consistent with 
democratic justice can win far more allies and supporters which would enable the “substantive 
representation” that Childs (2001) defined as the extent to which political representatives exhibit 
a “distinctive women’s perspective and issue positions” and “act decisively on the basis” of those 
same perspectives and positions. Such voting systems can improve upon the current, often mixed 
outcomes of gender quotas. Voting systems need to be reformed so that EWRs—not just women’s 
policy agencies—are empowered through having specified remits; I believe the voting system and 
mechanism(s) proposed within this article facilitates this and accounts for intersectionality.  
I concur with Squires’ (2007) contention that the “focus on securing gender equality in 
relations to the narrow institutions of parliament alone” through quotas as they are currently 
advocated “may well delimit wider concerns about gender equality, co-opting women into existing 
institutions rather than seeking to transform the nature of political engagement more profoundly.” 
To this end, I have sought to conceptualise ways in which gender quotas can be incorporated into 
more holistic and democratically-just voting systems wherein empowering and equitable political 
representation for all can be achieved, significantly improving gender-empowering and gender-
equitable representation.  
 
 
Limitations, potential criticisms and potential directions for future research 
This article insufficiently accounts for the state of the art in the gender quotas literature. 
However, engaging more thoroughly with the gender quotas literature balances against the 
necessity of elaborating upon the proposed voting system, including situating this article in relation 
to other pertinent social science literatures. Further, relevant reading on gender quotas includes 
Krook (2006, 2009, 2010), Krook and Norris (2014), Celis et al. (2014), Franceschet and Piscopo 
(2008), Franceschet, Krook and Piscopo (2012), Mastracci (2017), and Priebe (2017). 
Another limitation is that the voting system and mechanism(s) will not have any effect if 
there is institutional inertia with respect to implementation and if voters vote ‘dishonestly’. 
However, constructing a truthful/strategy-proof mechanism for this purpose is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Moreover, there are no mathematical formalisations presented in this article; a 
commensurate analysis and corresponding simulations of this proposed system have not been 
conducted. 
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Another criticism is that this system could lead to situations where no women (and/or other 
disadvantaged groups discussed) are elected. This possibility is also theoretically admitted in 
current voting systems but is not the case. Worst-case analysis regarding the effects upon groups 
of voters (in intersecting coalitions or otherwise) in this proposed system could build upon 
previous research into the Price of Anarchy in Algorithmic Game Theory settings (e.g. 
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999; Roughgarden and Tardos 2004; Kannan, Busch and Spirakis 
2013; Christodoulou et al. 2016). I postulate that tailored measures of inefficiency and unfairness 
will be required. 
This proposed mechanism does not directly represent the oft-marginalised interests of the 
disenfranchised such as animals (Singer 1973; Donovan 1990; Clark 2015), children (Jans 2004; 
Wall 2014; Tremmel and Wilhelm 2015), and non-nationals/immigrants (Bergh and Bjørklund 
2003; Rosberg 1977); however, voters can specify that they want to use their vote to indirectly 
advance others’ interests. 
The dimensions of candidate-qualities and interests will likely change over time. The 
voting system needs to remain malleable, generalisable, and extensible to allow societies to 
organically change. This mechanism should enable voters to semi-autonomously implement 
pareto-improving system changes (i.e., each addition leaves at least one voter better off without 
any other voter being made worse off). 
To make this research generalisable for other domains that can be characterised as voting 
games (e.g., employment and education), typical political/electoral voting games in democracies 
can be characterised as ‘unweighted’ (all voters have one, equal vote) whilst, in other domains, 
voters often have unequal weights assigned to their votes. The potential for using load-balancing 
games to model and simulate the outcomes of quotas is discussed briefly in the next section. 
 
 
Further remarks on the potential relevance for Social Choice theory 
Relating this back to Social Choice theory is crucial. As the designed voting 
system/mechanism(s) becomes increasingly complex, intuitive appeals to democratic justice will 
appear less convincing. Dealing with resource-allocation and agents’ interests, this proposal and 
subsequent iterations will face numerous obstacles in a political reality characterised by 
scepticism.  
Therefore, formally proving the effectiveness and fairness of these abstract voting 
procedures would facilitate trustworthiness. Computational Social Choice scholars (and, thus, in 
Algorithmic Game Theory and Economics & Computation more broadly) have significantly 
advanced the frontiers of Social Choice (see, for example, Brandt et al. (2016), Bartholdi III, Tovey 
and Trick (1989), and Roethe (2015)). Moreover, a strong tradition of using Social Choice theory 
persists among economists and political scientists (see, for example, Myerson (1999, 2013), 
Dryzek and List (2003), Pildes and Anderson (1990), Sen (1997, 1999), Maskin (1999), Reny 
(2001), Penn, Patty and Gailmard (2011), and Wilson (1972)). There have also been feminist 
philosophical interpretations and analyses of Social Choice theory (Peter 2003). One option may 
be to relate the properties of the proposed voting system/mechanism(s) back to the well-known 
and particularly profound results of Gibbard (1973), Satterthwaite (1975), and Arrow (1950, 
1963). Although beyond this article’s scope, I might still conjecture what such a mathematical 
and/or computational investigation may yield. 
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Conjecture 
Although the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem (and, therefore, Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem) will certainly hold if the resulting voting mechanism(s)/system is designed so that it has 
a truly unrestricted domain, more than 3 candidates, and is strategy-proof, it is possible that it will 
only be trivially dictatorial (whether that be in a positive, scientific sense, or a normative, practical 
one). This could be explained by the ongoing, dynamic nature of the proposed electoral rule in 
conjunction with previous computational complexity results. As such, the designed voting system 
(which needs to be mathematically formalised and further articulated) can and should aim to 
‘stretch’ the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem and any other identified, relevant theorems to their 
limits (potentially both in the figurative sense and the literal, mathematical analysis sense). 
 
 
The potential for and desirability of Computational Simulations 
Neither mathematical analysis and investigation nor concise and descriptive language will 
be sufficient for persuading stakeholders of the benefits of envisioned voting systems. When 
proposing fundamental voting system reform (which can be applied not just to politics but also to 
domains such as education, employment, and healthcare, for example), alternative investigations 
are required to understand potential benefits.  
One can use computational simulations to predict the potential outcomes of this voting 
system and variations of it; one way of doing this would be through implementing appropriate 
multi-agent systems (see, for example, Wooldridge (2009), Pitt et al. (2006), Shoham and Leyton-
Brown (2009), Shehory, Sycara and Jha (1998), Elkind et al. (2009), Marcolino, Jiang and Tambe 
(2009), and Serrano et al. (2014)) as well as agent-based models (see, for example, Masad and 
Kazil (2015), Axtell (2000), Miller and Page (2007), Klügl and Bazzan (2012), Schreiber (2014), 
Kogut, Colomer and Belinky (2013), Fieldhouse, Lessard-Philips and Edmonds (2016), and 
DellaPosta, Shi and Macy (2015)).  
Such simulations are beyond this paper’s scope. Moreover, as one programs and runs 
simulations, further possible improvements to the voting system will arise. The outputs of such 
endeavours could reasonably constitute several distinct articles (especially when seeking to use 
different initial datasets or when adapting the voting system for different contexts).  
Simulations also yield original, artificial data for predicting the potential impact of this 
hitherto untested mechanism; this would be especially useful where pre-existing, real-world data 
is currently insufficient for predicting impact. One possibility to consider for simulating the 
outcomes of voter-chosen quotas is to model them as a variation of load-balancing games (see, for 
example, Even-Dar, Kesselman and Mansour 2001; Koutsoupias, Panagopolou and Spirakis 2007; 
Aumann and Domb 2010) where the tasks not only have different weights and are divisible but 
also such that there are different types of tasks and each of the machines have a vector of speeds 




 Quotas for women, as they are currently advocated, can confer significant benefits through 
encouraging more gender-equitable forms of political representation. However, they are both 
conceptually and empirically problematic. They do not necessarily lead to their intended outcomes 
and they legally restrict many voters’ democratic choice. I have outlined an alternative conception 
of a holistic and democratically-just voting system that seeks to harmonise with mainstream 
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conceptions of democratic justice through flexible, preference-contingent and voter-chosen quotas 
that can advance gender empowerment more effectively, especially when compared to how quotas 
are currently advocated and implemented. Through voting system reform that ceases the inherent 
privileging of geospatial-constituency representation, (gender) quotas may win more allies through 
facilitating much-needed reforms in representative democracies the world over. A geospatial-
constituency paradigm of representation essentially imposes ‘geographical quota’ (from the 
perspective of the outlined voting system); restricting representation to this mode is inherently 
undemocratic. The proposed voting system and mechanism(s) within this article would facilitate 
fluidity and flexibility in the institutionalisation of legislatures’ quotas whilst incorporating 
contemporary, significant, and legitimate intersectionality concerns. 
 Through substantive incorporation of intersectionality, the interests of various 
demographics, communities, and peoples with various qualities throughout societies can be 
represented more effectively and equitably. This includes the interests of people of various 
religions, races, ethnicities, sexualities, gender identities, ages, disabilities, occupations, 
professions, qualifications, incomes, communities, educations, socioeconomic backgrounds, 
ideologies etc. and even the historically disenfranchised (e.g., children and animals).  
 Thus, a broader class of related and interconnected political problems can be confronted 
through implementing the proposed voting system (not only in politics but also in other distinct 
contexts such as education and employment, for example). The proposed voting system inherently 
expands peoples’ (political) freedoms to advance or even optimise democratic and social justice. 
Formal mathematical analyses and/or computational simulations are necessary and desirable but 
beyond this paper’s scope.  
 Politically implementing the proposed voting system and mechanism(s), would be more 
practical for some countries than others for various reasons. For example, his might be more 
practical for democratic countries with ‘unwritten constitutions’; those with unwritten 
constitutions may be able to adopt this proposed voting system (or variations of it) with fewer legal 
hurdles than countries with codified constitutions. This could include Canada, Israel, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Countries with codified constitutions could still adopt the 
proposed voting system and mechanism(s), but I envision greater legal hurdles unless such 
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